We show a new lower bound on the sample complexity of (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms that accurately answer statistical queries on high-dimensional databases. The novelty of our bound is that it depends optimally on the parameter δ, which loosely corresponds to the probability that the algorithm fails to be private, and is the first to smoothly interpolate between approximate differential privacy (δ > 0) and pure differential privacy (δ = 0).
Introduction
The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to enable rich statistical analysis of a database while protecting the privacy of individuals whose data is in the database. A formal privacy guarantee is given by (ε, δ)-differential privacy [DMNS06, DKM + 06], which ensures that no individual's data has a significant influence on the information released about the database. The two parameters ε and δ control the level of privacy. Very roughly, ε is an upper bound on the amount of influence an individual's record has on the information released and δ is the probability that this bound fails to hold 1 , so the definition becomes more stringent as ε, δ → 0.
A natural way to measure the tradeoff between privacy and utility is sample complexitythe minimum number of records n that is sufficient in order to publicly release a given set of statistics about the database, while achieving both differential privacy and statistical accuracy. Intuitively, it's easier to achieve these two goals when n is large, as each individual's data will have only a small influence on the aggregate statistics of interest. Conversely, the sample complexity n should increase as ε and δ decrease (which strengthens the privacy guarantee).
The strongest version of differential privacy, in which δ = 0, is known as pure differential privacy. The sample complexity of achieving pure differential privacy is well known for many settings (e.g. [HT10] ). The more general case where δ > 0 is known as approximate differential privacy, and is less well understood. Recently, Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan [BUV14] showed how to prove strong lower bounds for approximate differential privacy that are essentially optimal for δ ≈ 1/n, which is essentially the weakest privacy guarantee that is still meaningful. 2 Since δ bounds the probability of a complete privacy breach, we would like δ to be very small. Thus we would like to quantify the cost (in terms of sample complexity) as δ → 0. In this work we give lower bounds for approximately differentially private algorithms that are nearly optimal for every choice of δ, and smoothly interpolate between pure and approximate differential privacy.
Specifically, we consider algorithms that compute the one-way marginals of the database-an extremely simple and fundamental family of queries. For a database D ∈ {±1} n×d , the d one-way marginals are simply the mean of the bits in each of the d columns. Formally, we define 
1 This intuition is actually somewhat imprecise, although it is suitable for this informal discussion. See [KS08] for a more precise semantic interpretation of (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
2 When δ ≥ 1/n there are algorithms that are intuitively not private, yet satisfy (0, δ)-differential privacy.
The previous best lower bounds are n ≥ Ω(d/εα) [HT10] for pure differential privacy and n ≥ Ω( √ d/εα) for approximate differential privacy with δ = o(1/n) [BUV14] . Our main result is an optimal lower bound that combines the previous lower bounds.
More generally, this is the first result showing that the sample complexity must grow by a multiplicative factor of log(1/δ) for answering any family of queries, as opposed to an additive dependence on δ. We also remark that the assumption on the range of δ is necessary, as the Laplace mechanism gives accuracy α and satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy when n ≥ O(d/εα).
Average-Case Versus Worst-Case Error
Our lower bound holds for mechanisms with an average-case (L 1 ) error guarantee. Thus, it also holds for algorithms that achieve worst-case (L ∞ ) error guarantees. The Laplace mechanism gives a matching upper bound for average-case error. In many cases worst-case error guarantees are preferrable. For worst-case error, the sample complexity of the Laplace mechanism degrades by an additional log d factor compared to (1).
Surprisingly, this degradation is not necessary. We present algorithms that answer every one-way marginal with α accuracy and improve on the sample complexity of the Laplace mechanism by roughly a log d factor. These algorithms demonstrate that the widely used technique of adding independent noise to each query is suboptimal when the goal is to achieve worst-case error guarantees.
Our algorithm for pure differential privacy satisfies the following. 
And our algorithm for approximate differential privacy is as follows. 
there exists an efficient mechanism M :
These algorithms improve over the sample complexity of the best known mechanisms for each privacy and accuracy guarantee by a factor of (log(d)) Ω(1) . Namely, the Laplace mechanism requires n ≥ O(d · log d/εα) samples for pure differential privacy and the Gaussian mechanism requires n ≥ O( d · log(1/δ) · log d/εα) samples for approximate differential privacy.
Privacy Accuracy Type Previous bound
This work 
Techniques
Lower Bounds: Our lower bound relies on a combinatorial objected called a fingerprinting code [BS98] . Fingerprinting codes were originally used in cryptography for watermarking digital content, but several recent works have shown they are intimately connected to lower bounds for differential privacy and related learning problems [Ull13, BUV14, HU14, SU14]. In particular, Bun et al. [BUV14] showed that fingerprinting codes can be used to construct an attack demonstrating that any mechanism that accurately answers one-way marginals is not differentially private. Specifically, a fingerprinting code gives a distribution on individuals' data and a corresponding "tracer" algorithm such that, if a database is constructed from the data of a fixed subset of the individuals, then the tracer algorithm can identify at least one of the individuals in that subset given only approximate answers to the one-way marginals of the database. Specifically, their attack shows that a mechanism that satisfies (1, o(1/n))-differential privacy requires n ≥Ω( √ d) samples to accurately compute one-way marginals. Our proof uses a new, more general reduction from breaking fingerprinting codes to differentially private data release. Specifically, our reduction uses group differential privacy. This property states that if an algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to the change of one individual's data, then for any k, it is roughly (kε, e kε δ)-differentially private with respect to the change of k individuals' data. Thus an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm provides a meaningful privacy guarantee for groups of size k ≈ log(1/δ)/ε.
To use this in our reduction, we start with a mechanism M that takes a database of n rows and is (ε, δ)-differentially private. We design a mechanism M k that takes a database of n/k rows, copies each of its rows k times, and uses the result as input to M. The resulting mechanism M k is roughly (kε, e kε δ)-differentially private. For our choice of k, these parameters will be small enough to apply the attack of [BUV14] to obtain a lower bound on the number of samples used by M k , which is n/k. Thus, for larger values of k (equivalently, smaller values of δ), we obtain a stronger lower bound. The remainder of the proof is to quantify the parameters precisely.
Upper Bounds: Our algorithm for pure differential privacy and worst-case error is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism [MT07] using the L ∞ norm. That is, the mechanism samples y ∈ R d with probability proportional to exp(−η y ∞ ) and outputs M(D) = D + y. In contrast, adding independent Laplace noise corresponds to using the exponential mechanism with the L 1 norm and adding independent Gaussian noise corresponds to using the exponential mechanism with the L 2 norm squared. Using this distribution turns out to give better tail bounds than adding independent noise.
For approximate differential privacy, we use a completely different algorithm. We start by adding independent Gaussian noise to each marginal. However, rather than using a union bound to show that each Gaussian error is small with high probability, we use a Chernoff bound to show that most errors are small. Namely, with the sample complexity that we allow M, we can ensure that all but a 1/polylog(d) fraction of the errors are small. Now we "fix" the d/polylog(d) marginals that are bad. The trick is that we use the sparse vector algorithm, which allows us to do indentify and fix these d/polylog(d) marginals with sample complexity corresponding to only d/polylog(d) queries, rather than d queries.
Preliminaries
We define a database D ∈ {±1} n×d to be a matrix of n rows, where each row corresponds to an individual, and each row has dimension d (consists of d binary attributes). We say that two databases D, D ∈ {±1} n×d are adjacent if they differ only by a single row, and we denote this by D ∼ D . In particular, we can replace the ith row of a database D with some fixed element of
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06] ). Let M : {±1} n×d → R be a randomized mechanism. We say that M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two adjacent databases D ∼ D and every subset S ⊆ R,
A well known fact about differential privacy is that it generalizes smoothly to databases that differ on more than a single row. We say that two databases D, D ∈ {±1} n×d are k-adjacent if they differ by at most k rows, and we denote this by D ∼ k D .
Fact 2.2 (Group Differential Privacy). For every
All of the upper and lower bounds for one-way marginals have a multiplicative 1/αε dependence on the accuracy α and the privacy loss ε. This is no coincidence -there is a generic reduction: Suppose there exists a (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism M :
This fact allows us to suppress the accuracy parameter α and the privacy loss ε when proving our lower bounds. Namely, if we prove a lower bound of n ≥ n * for all (1, δ)-differentially private mechanisms M :
. So we will simply fix the parameters α = 1/10 and ε = 1 in our lower bounds.
Lower Bounds for Approximate Differential Privacy
Our main theorem can be stated as follows.
)-differentially private mechanism that answers one-way marginals such that
where D is the true answer vector. If 2 −Ω(n) ≤ δ ≤ 1/n 1+Ω(1) and n is sufficiently large, then
Theorem 1.1 in the introduction follows by rearranging terms, and applying Fact 2.3. The statement above is more convenient technically, but the statement in the introduction is more consistent with the literature.
First we must introduce fingerprinting codes. The following definition is tailored to the application to privacy. Fingerprinting codes were originally defined by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] with a worst-case accuracy guarantee. Subsequent works [BUV14, SU14] have altered the accuracy guarantee to an average-case one, which we use here. 
Completeness: For any fixed
M : {±1} n×d → [±1] d , P M(D) − D 1 ≤ αd ∧ (Trace(M(D)) = ∅) ≤ ε.
Soundness: For any i ∈ [n] and fixed
where D −i denotes D with the i th row replaced by some fixed element of {±1} d .
Fingerprinting codes with optimal length were first constructed by Tardos [Tar08] (for worst-case error) and subsequent works [BUV14, SU14] have adapted Tardos' construction to work for average-case error guarantees, which yields the following theorem. We now show how the existence of fingerprinting codes implies our lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 from Theorem 3.3. Let
Then, by Markov's inequality,
Let k be a parameter to be chosen later. By group privacy (Fact 2.
e−1 δ -differentially private mechanism. By the triangle inequality,
Now
and, by (2) and (3),
is as in Theorem 3.3. We will show by contradiction that this cannot be -that is
be a 1/100-complete δ-sound 1/8-robust L 1 fingerprinting code for n k users of length d.
By the completeness of the fingerprinting code,
Combinging (4) and (5), gives
In particular, there exists i * ∈ [n k ] such that
where the second inequality follows from the soundness of the fingerprinting code.
Combining (6) and (7) gives
If
. This setting of k gives a contradiction, which implies that
as required.
New Mechanisms for L ∞ Error
Adding independent noise seems very natural for one-way marginals, but it is suboptimal if one is interested in worst-case (i.e. L ∞ ) error bounds, rather than average-case (i.e. L 1 ) error bounds. • Privacy:
Pure Differential Privacy
• Accuracy: For all α > 0,
• Efficiency: D can be efficiently sampled.
Proof. The distribution D is simply an instantiation of the exponential mechanism [MT07] . In particular, the probability density function is given by
Formally, for every measurable S ⊆ R d ,
Firstly, this is clearly a well-defined distribution as long as ε/∆ > 0. Privacy is easy to verify: It suffices to bound the ratio of the probability densities for the shifted distributions. For x, x ∈ R d with ||x − x|| ∞ ≤ ∆, by the triangle inequality,
To prove accuracy, we must give a tail bound on D * . The probability density function of D * is given by
which is obtained by integrating the probability density function of D over the infinity-ball of radius z, which has surface area d2 d z d−1 ∝ z d−1 . Thus D * is precisely the gamma distribution with shape d and mean d∆/ε. The moment generating function is therefore 
there exists a mechanism SV with the following properties.
• SV takes as input a database D ∈ X n and provides answers
• SV is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
• Assuming
A proof of this theorem can be found in [DR13, Theorem 3.28]. 4 We now describe our approximately differentially private mechanism.
Instantiate SV from Theorem 4.2 with parameters Proof of Theorem 1.3. Firstly, we consider the privacy of M:ã is the output of the Gaussian mechanism with parameters to ensure that it is a (ε/2, δ/2)-differentially private function of D. Likewiseâ is the output of SV with parameters to ensure that it is also a (ε/2, δ/2)-differentially private function of D. Since the output isã + 2â, composition implies that M as a whole is (ε, δ)-differentially private, as required. Now we must prove accuracy. Suppose that
as required. So we need only show that
, which sparse vector guarantees will happen with probability at least 1 − β SV as long as
Now we verify that (9) holds with high probability. By our setting of parameters, we have q j (D) = −z j /2. This means
Let E j ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator of the event |q j (D)| > α SV /2. Since the z j s are independent, so are the E j s. Thus we can apply a Chernoff bound:
The failure probability of M is bounded by the failure probability of SV plus (10), which is dominated by β SV = exp(− log 4 d).
Finally we consider the sample complexity. The accuracy is bounded by for sparse vector to work, which is also satisfied.
We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the constant factors in this analysis.
A Alternative Lower Bound for Pure Differential Privacy
It is known [HT10] that any ε-differentially private mechanism that answers d one-way marginals requires n ≥ Ω(d/ε) samples. Our techniques yield an alternative simple proof of this fact. 
Then n ≥ Ω(d/ε).
The proof uses a special case of Hoeffding's Inequality:
Lemma A.2 (Hoeffding's Inequality). Let X ∈ {±1} n be uniformly random and a ∈ R n fixed. Then 
